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Block Trading, Ownership Structure,  










This paper shows that open market block trading can provide a link between 
private benefits of control enjoyed by large shareholders and the “voting premium”, 
i.e. the price difference between voting and non-voting shares. We first demonstrate in 
a microstructure model with informed traders and short-selling constraint that the 
trading activity of blockholders translates into a spread between the prices of voting 
and non-voting shares. In contrast to the extant theory, this model can explain the 
voting premium in the absence of corporate takeovers. In the empirical part of the 
paper, we show for a comprehensive sample of German dual-class companies that 
large trades occur more often in voting shares than in non-voting shares, and that the 
block trading activity in voting shares is strongly correlated with the voting premium. 
Moreover, the effect of the ownership structure on the voting premium becomes 
insignificant once we control for the block trading activity in voting shares. 
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1. Introduction 
It is empirically well established that share prices reflect private benefits of control 
which are enjoyed by only a few major blockholders. Estimates of the proportion of 
the share price that can be attributed to these private benefits of control range between 
5% for the US (Lease, McConnell and Mikkelson, 1983) and 82% for Italy (Zingales, 
1994). The aim of this paper is to re-examine the mechanism that links private 
benefits of control to share prices. A thorough understanding of how private benefits 
are reflected in share prices is relevant for at least two fields in corporate governance: 
First, it will foster our understanding of the relationship between a firm’s ownership 
structure and its market value. Second, it is relevant for the estimation of private 
benefits of control from stock market data, especially because such estimates are often 
used as proxy for minority shareholder expropriation. 
Previous studies (Grossman and Hart, 1988; Bergström and Rydqvist, 1992; 
Zingales, 1995; Rydqvist, 1996) identify corporate takeovers as the link between 
private benefits of control and share prices. They argue that the takeover premium 
reflects the private benefits of the future owner of the firm, so that the market value of 
control is a part of the expected takeover premium. This theory turned out to be 
successful in many cross-sectional empirical studies of dual-class firms. Nevertheless, 
for most countries for which evidence is available (see Section 2 for a short review), 
takeovers are too infrequent and takeover premia are too small to explain the so-called 
voting premium, i.e., the observed price difference between voting and non-voting 
shares. Therefore, takeover premia cannot be the only link between private benefits of 
control and share prices. 
This paper proposes an alternative theory that is based on open market block share 
purchases rather than takeovers. We argue that blockholders form a coalition in order 
to share private benefits. If such a coalition becomes unstable, current blockholders or 
outsiders might want to buy small blocks of voting shares in the market in order to 
improve their bargaining power in the coalition. If the market for the company’s 
shares is not perfectly liquid, such block purchases will drive up prices resulting in a 
transfer of wealth from the buyer of the block to some of the holders of voting shares. 
In the theoretical part of the paper, we demonstrate that the random demand for small 
blocks of voting shares translates into a spread between voting and non-voting share  3
prices. Hence, open market block share purchases can potentially explain the observed 
voting premium or a part of it. In an empirical analysis of 79 German dual-class 
companies, we provide substantial evidence for the new theory. In particular, we find 
that large trades are executed more often in voting shares than in non-voting shares 
and that the block trading activity in voting shares can explain a substantial part of the 
variation in the voting premium. We also show that the effect of the ownership 
structure on the voting premium becomes insignificant once we control for the block 
trading activity in voting shares. 
As usual in the literature on the market value of control, we focus on dual-class 
companies, because the market value of control can be easily measured for these 
companies. Note, however, that the phenomenon and our theory is not restricted to 
dual-class firms. The share price of any single-class firm will contain a voting 
premium, although it might be impossible to disentangle it from the value of the cash-
flow rights. 
The technical challenge of our argument is to explain why block purchases have a 
price impact and why typical holders of voting shares can expect a gain from selling 
their shares to block buyers. To this end, we present a microstructure model in the 
veins of Kyle (1985) and Kyle and Vila (1991). In this model, the market is driven by 
a blockholder who might order an additional block of voting shares and by a number 
of potentially informed investors who might receive a signal about the future value of 
the firm and trade on this information. As market makers cannot distinguish between 
orders of informed traders and orders of the blockholder, the blockholder’s block 
purchase will lead to a temporary price increase of voting shares and to a transfer of 
wealth from blockholder to informed traders. Due to short-selling restrictions, 
potentially informed investors can obtain the full value of their potential information 
only if they already own voting shares when they receive their signal. Hence, they 
will buy voting shares in a previous period and, given that there are many potentially 
informed investors, the price of voting shares will be higher than the price of non-
voting shares – even though the terminal payoff is identical for both types of shares. 
Our theory yields a number of testable implications, including some that cannot be 
derived from the takeover theory. We test these implications in the empirical part of 
the paper, using data on 79 German dual-class companies from 1974 to 2000. We use 
German data, because Germany is one of the largest capital markets for which (at  4
least historically) the takeover theory is not a convincing explanation of the observed 
voting premium. 
We first construct a measure of the block trading activity in voting shares: For each 
company and each year, we identify the 5 percent largest trades in the combined 
sample of voting and non-voting shares. Our measure of the block trading activity in 
voting shares is the percentage of these largest trades that was executed in voting 
shares. We establish that, after controlling for differences in liquidity, 56 percent of 
the 5 percent largest trades were executed in voting shares compared to 44 percent in 
non-voting shares. This corroborates our model’s implication that the block-trading 
activity is stronger in voting shares than in non-voting shares. Our model also implies 
that the block trading activity in voting shares depends on the firm’s ownership 
structure, because the ownership structure determines the stability of the ruling 
coalition and thereby the likelihood of further open market block purchases. We 
indeed find that the block trading activity in voting shares is significantly negatively 
related to the size of the largest block of voting shares. Finally, we present 
overwhelming evidence that the block trading activity in voting shares is positively 
related to the voting premium. Using instrumental variables regressions, we show that 
the well-known dependence of the voting premium on the ownership structure is only 
indirect: The voting premium depends on the block trading activity, which in turn 
depends on the ownership structure. Once we control for the block trading activity, 
the ownership structure has no significant effect on the voting premium. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the 
empirical evidence for our claim that the takeover theory can only explain a part of 
the observed voting premium. Section 3 presents the microstructure model and the 
theoretical results. Section 4 discusses the model’s empirical implications, and 
Section 5 describes the dataset. In Section 6, we define and analyze a measure for the 
block trading activity in voting shares. Section 7 explores the empirical relationship 
between this measure and the voting premium. Section 8 concludes and discusses the 
relevance of our results for the relationship between ownership and control. The 
appendix contains a list of all variables used and the proofs of the propositions.  5
2. Corporate takeovers and the voting premium 
There are two variants of the theory that explains the voting premium by corporate 
takeovers. The non-cooperative variant (Grossman and Hart, 1988, Harris and Raviv, 
1988, Zingales, 1995, Rydqvist, 1996) assumes that most of the company’s shares are 
widely held and that two bidders engage in a takeover contest for 50 percent of the 
company’s votes in order to obtain private benefits of control. In this setting, the price 
of voting shares is bid up to the lower of the two bidders’ reservation prices, so that 
the price difference between voting and non-voting shares reflects the expected 
private benefits of the unsuccessful bidder. This theory is convincing for developed 
countries of English and Scandinavian origin where companies are indeed widely held 
and takeover contests are common.
1 In other countries, however, shares are typically 
not widely held (La Porta et al. 1999) and hostile takeovers are rare (Rossi and 
Volpin, 2003). Still, we observe substantial (often even comparatively large) voting 
premia in these countries. 
Bergström and Rydqvist (1992) present a cooperative version of the takeover 
theory. They assume that the bidder wants to buy 100 percent of the target firm and 
therefore negotiates the acquisition with the incumbent blockholder. Due to her 
bargaining power, the incumbent blockholder can extract a part of the bidder’s private 
benefits of control, i.e. the bidder pays a premium on voting shares. While this model 
does not rely on hostile takeovers, it still predicts differential takeover bids for voting 
and non-voting shares. In the remainder of this section, we therefore review the 
empirical evidence on differential takeover bids and the voting premium for various 
countries. In particular, we want to find out whether differential takeover bids can 
explain the price difference between voting and non-voting shares empirically. 
Table 1 displays some key results of twelve empirical studies on the value of the 
voting right. The first three columns describe the analyzed sample. The fourth column 
displays the ex-ante voting premium, i.e. the average relative price difference between 
voting and non-voting shares. This price difference varies between 5.4% for the US 
and 81.5% for Italy. In addition, the table shows the number of tender offers with 
differential bids that are reported in these studies, the average premium paid for 
                                                 
1 DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985) report, however, that voting shares of U.S. dual class companies 
are not widely held.  6
voting shares relative to non-voting shares in these tender offers, and the ex-post 
voting premium, which is the average tender offer premium multiplied by the 
probability of a differential tender offer. The table shows that even for the US and the 
UK, the ex-post voting premium is much lower than the ex-ante voting premium. The 
studies for Israel, Germany, Switzerland and Italy, report no differential bids but still 
substantial ex-ante voting premia.
2 Only for Canada, ex-ante and ex-post voting 
premia are of comparable size. Hence, Table 1 suggests that the takeover theory 
cannot explain the observed ex-ante voting premium (except for Canada). 
One might try to reconcile the evidence presented in Table 1 with the takeover 
theory by recognizing that there are events other than tender offers that can terminate 
the dual-class structure. Frequently, dual-class firms choose to convert non-voting 
shares into voting shares in order to simplify their share structure. If non-voting shares 
are treated unfavorably in such dual-class stock unifications, these stock unifications 
might explain the discrepancy between ex-ante and ex-post voting premium in Table 
1. The empirical evidence shows, however, that this is not the case, at least for the 
U.S., Israel, Germany, Switzerland, and Italy. Typically, non-voting shares are 
converted one-to-one into voting shares without any compensation to voting 
shareholders. In those cases, in which voting shareholders receive a compensation, the 
compensation is considerably lower than the previous voting premium. Hence, 
compared to the ex-ante voting premium, non-voting shares benefit from dual-class 
stock unifications.
3 Only for the U.K., there is evidence that voting shareholders 
receive a compensation in dual class stock unifications that justifies the observed ex-
ante voting premium (see Ang and Megginson, 1989). To sum up, differential 
takeover premia and stock unifications can explain the size of the ex-ante voting 
premium for Canada and the U.K. For the U.S., Israel, Germany, Switzerland, and 
                                                 
2 Except for Lease, McConnell and Mikkelson (1983) and Zingales (1994), the papers with zero 
differential tender offers in Table 1 do not explicitly state that there were no differential tender offers 
during  the sample period. However, all of them used the takeover theory to justify the price difference, 
so that they had a strong incentive to present this supporting material if it had been available. 
Moreover, according to our own research, there has been only a single differential takeover bid in post-
war Germany; it occurred in 2003 and involved a takeover premium of 42%. 
3 See Lease, McConnell and Mikkelson (1983), Hauser and Lauterbach (2002), Dittmann and 
Ulbricht (2003), Kunz and Angel (2003), and Bigelli (2004) for an empirical analysis of the terms of 
conversion in, respectively, U.S., Israeli, German, Swiss, and Italian dual class unifications.  7
Italy, however, a large part of the voting premium cannot be attributed to takeovers or 
stock unifications. 
There is also more direct evidence that the takeover hypothesis cannot be the 
whole story. Maynes (1996) analyzes 46 Canadian dual-class firms, 19 of which have 
a so-called “participation coattail”, i.e. a company by-law which states that, in case of 
a takeover bid, the holders of restricted voting shares have the right to convert their 
shares one-to-one into superior voting shares and tender them to the bidder. This by-
law effectively prevents tender offers with differential bids. Consequently, the 
takeover theory predicts that the voting premium should be zero for firms with such a 
participation coattail. Maynes (1996) finds however that the voting premium is still 
5.5 percent for firms with participation coattail compared to 8.2 percent for firms 
without coattail provision. 
So although there is a lot of evidence in favor of the takeover theory, the empirical 
literature clearly shows that this theory cannot fully explain the observed size of the 
voting premium for many countries. Therefore, we are going to develop an alternative 
(or rather: additional) theory that might explain the remaining part. This theory is 
based on open-market block share purchases of a blockholder who wants to increase 
her voting power in the company. Such block purchases have been documented in the 
context of dual-class firms by Rydqvist (1996) and Bruner (1999). 
3. A microstructure model of the voting premium 
This section presents a microstructure model that describes the trading in voting 
and non-voting shares of a dual-class firm. There are two types of traders: a 
blockholder who potentially buys voting shares because she can derive private 
benefits from them, and a number of potentially informed investors who might 
observe the quality of the firm and trade on this information. We first show that, in 
expectation, potentially informed investors gain on their superior information at the 
cost of the blockholder. We then describe how this expected gain is reflected in stock 
market data. 
3.1 Set-up of the model 
We consider one blockholder, N potentially informed investors, and an unspecified 
number of uninformed investors. All individuals are risk-neutral. The model has three 
stages. At time t = 1, non-voting shares and a part of the voting shares (the free-float)  8
are sold to investors. At time t = 2, trading takes place in voting and non-voting 
shares. At time t = 3, all shares are liquidated and receive the liquidation payment L
~
 
which takes on L  and L ( L L < ) with equal probabilities. L
~
 is realized before time t 
= 2 but remains unknown to all but one investor until time t = 3. Throughout the 
paper, symbols with tilde refer to random variables. Realizations of random variables 
are denoted by the same symbols without a tilde. 
Before time t = 2, the blockholder learns her private signal B
~
, which is equal to 
0 > B  with probability α and zero otherwise. B
~
 is the additional monetary value of 
private benefits she can obtain at time t = 3 if she owns an additional block b of voting 
shares, where b is a constant. We do not explicitly model how the opportunity to 
obtain private benefits arises. Zwiebel (1995) presents a model in which blockholders 
form coalitions in order to obtain and share private benefits. If such a coalition 
becomes unstable (e.g. due to the death of a pivotal blockholder) an outsider might 
want to buy a block in order to become member of a future coalition. Also before time 
t = 2, one of the N potentially informed investors observes L
~
, and each of them is 




 are independent, 
that α < ½, and that  2 / ) ( b L L B − ≥ . The last two conditions prevent two tedious 
case distinctions which we will discuss after Proposition 2. 
At time t = 2, each investor (informed and uninformed) and the blockholder can 
buy or sell voting and/or non-voting shares. We assume that posting an order results 
in an infinitesimal cost, so that individuals who do not expect a gain from trading do 
not trade. Thus, only the informed investor and the blockholder will potentially trade. 
Let  yv and ynv be the informed trader’s demand for voting and non-voting shares, 
respectively. Positive numbers are buy orders and negative numbers sell orders. We 
assume that short-selling is not allowed, i.e., -yv and -ynv are bounded by the number 
of respective shares held by the investor. Let uv and unv denote the corresponding 
orders of the blockholder. The market is organized as proposed by Kyle (1985): A 
market maker observes the total orders yv + uv and ynv + unv but not the individual 





before time t = 3. The market for market making is competitive, so the market maker 
will set a price equal to the expected liquidation value conditional on the two trading 
volumes observed:  ) , |
~
( 2 2 nv nv v v
nv v u y u y L E P P + + = =   9
We assume that the informed trader can only order the quantities b/2, 0, or –b/2. 
Further, we assume that the number M of voting shares sold to the public at time t = 1 
is a multiple of b/2: M = m b/2 with m being an integer, and that m < N, i.e. only some 
of the potentially informed investors can own a block of b/2. 
3.2 Equilibrium prices and voting premium 
As the blockholder is also subject to the infinitesimal cost of posting an order, she 
will never place an order if B = 0. Likewise, she will never place an order for non-
voting shares, because private benefits can only be obtained from voting shares. As a 
consequence, the informed investor will also never trade in non-voting shares, 
because every trade in non-voting shares would reveal the private signal to the market 
maker, who would adjust prices immediately.  
 
Proposition 1: (Equilibrium at time t = 2) 
a)  The blockholder will  
•  buy a block b of voting shares if she observes  B B = . 
•  not trade if she observes  0 = B . 
b)  The informed investor will 
•  buy b/2 voting shares if he observes  L L = , 
•  sell b/2 voting shares if he observes  L L =  and if he owns at least b/2 
voting shares, 
•  not trade if  L L =  and if he does not own at least b/2 voting shares. 
 
There are two cases in which the informed investor will realize a trading gain: (1) 
if he sells b/2 voting shares and the blockholder orders b; and (2) if he orders b/2 and 
the blockholder orders nothing. In both cases, the total order is b/2, so the market 
maker cannot infer the informed investor’s information from the total order. In case 
(1), the blockholder will therefore pay an unfavorably high price and realize a trading 
loss. Since the market maker makes zero profits on average, the expected loss of the 
blockholder equals the expected gain of the informed trader. 
Due to the assumed short-selling restriction, the informed investor can sell shares 
on a negative signal only if he already owns b/2 shares. If he does not own b/2 shares 
at time t = 2, he cannot gain from his superior information if  L L = . Therefore, all  10
potentially informed investors will want to buy a block of b/2 voting shares at time t = 
1. As there are (by assumption) more potentially informed investors than blocks b/2 in 
the free-float, the price of voting shares is bid up to the potentially informed investors’ 
reservation price that is higher than the expected liquidation value of the shares. 
 
Proposition 2: At time t = 1, the price for non-voting shares is equal to the expected 
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π . (1) 
  The block purchase premium, π, strictly increases in the probability, α, that the 
blockholder can obtain additional private benefits (as long as α < ½). All voting 
shares are held by potentially informed investors. 
 
Proposition 2 states that the price of voting shares is higher if block purchases are 
more likely. This result holds as long as α < ½. If α exceeds some threshold above ½, 
then the price of voting shares decreases with increasing α. The reason is that the 
driving force behind the block purchase premium is the uncertainty about whether the 
blockholder will buy a block in the market. If α = 0 or α = 1, there is no uncertainty 
and the block purchase premium is zero. Also note that the trading activity of the 
informed trader translates into a cost to the blockholder when she buys a block b. If 
her private benefits B  fall below a threshold below  2 / ) ( b L L − , these costs are larger 
than  B , and we would obtain an equilibrium in mixed strategies. The proofs of the 
two propositions and the precise thresholds for α and B  are given in the appendix. 
Table 2 displays some values of the block purchase premium, π, for different 
probabilities  α  and different amounts of private information  L L − − − − . The example 
assumes that the voting share free float is 40%, which is a typical value for the dual-
class firms in the sample we consider in Section 4. In addition, we assume that there 
are N = 50 potentially informed traders, that the block size b = 2%, and that the value 
of the firm is normalized to one. The first line shows that a probability α = 1% and 
private information of ± 5% (i.e.,  L L − − − −  = 0.1) result in a block purchase premium of 
π = 0.001%. If we stipulate that the modeled period is one trading day, the annual 
block purchase premium is approximately 250·π = 0.25%, because a year has about  11
250 trading days. An additional expected annual income of 0.25% discounted at a rate 
of 5.5% results in a relative price difference between voting and non-voting shares of 
4.5%. Note that this is about the size of the relative price difference we observe in the 
U.S. (cf. Lease, McConnell and Mikkelson, 1983). Hence, the model can generate 
realistic voting premia under plausible assumptions.
4 
4.  Testable implications of the model 
The model yields a number of testable implications that can be divided into two 
classes. The first class contains those hypotheses that can also be derived from the 
standard theory by Rydqvist (1996) and Zingales (1995). These are hypotheses about 
the block purchase probability α  in our model and, respectively, the takeover 
probability in the Rydqvist/Zingales model. Clearly, any variable that has a positive 
impact on the takeover probability should also have a positive effect on the block 
purchase probability. In both models, an increase in the respective probability leads to 
a higher voting premium (see Proposition 2). Therefore, both models imply that the 
voting premium should be a declining function of the largest block of voting shares, 
because a control contest is unlikely when the largest block of voting shares is large. 
Moreover, the voting premium should decrease in the firm’s market capitalization, 
because the bigger the firm, the more expensive it is to buy a block (or even the whole 
firm). These hypotheses have been tested and mostly confirmed in many empirical 
studies (see, e.g., Smith and Amoako-Adu, 1995). Therefore, we will not explicitly 
test them again. 
The more interesting hypotheses implied by our model are those that cannot be 
derived from the Rydqvist/Zingales model. These are hypotheses about block 
purchases, i.e., the proposed mechanism that links private benefits of control to share 
prices. We consider three such hypotheses in this paper: 
1.  Large trades are more likely to occur in voting shares than in non-voting 
shares. 
                                                 
4 Our assumptions b = 2% and α = 1% imply that, on average, 5% of the voting shares are bought 
by blockholders each year. In the sample that is described in Section 5, the free float of voting shares is 
42% on average and varies by an average 5.8% from year to year in absolute terms. Hence, our 
assumptions regarding b, α, and the free float are plausible.  12
2.  The block-trading activity in voting shares is negatively related to the size 
of the largest voting block and to the market capitalization of the firm. 
3.  The block-trading activity in voting shares is positively correlated with the 
voting premium and can explain a part of the variation in the voting 
premium. 
The next section describes the construction of the dataset. After that, we will 
introduce a measure for the block-trading activity in voting shares and then consider 
each of the three hypotheses in turn. 
5. The dataset 
Most of the dataset has been constructed from Karlsruher Kapitalmarkt Datenbank 
(KKMDB), a scientific database that contains daily German stock market data from 
1974 onwards. Dual class companies have been identified by their German security 
identification number: The first five digits identify the firm and the last digit the class 
of shares. For all these dual-class firms we compiled ownership information, the 
number of outstanding shares and charter provisions regarding voting power and 
dividend differences from Handbuch der deutschen Aktiengesellschaften, the German 
equivalent of Moody’s Manual. We excluded firms for which (1) there are no 
differences in voting rights, (2) one or both classes are subject to trading restrictions 
or (3) we could not find any information on the voting arrangement. In addition, we 
excluded one company (Sixt A.G.) that unified its dual class structure twice within 
eight years only to issue new non-voting shares a few weeks later both times. No 
other company introduced new non-voting shares after unifying its dual-class 
structure.  
Daily price, return and volume data stem from KKMDB. When we construct 
annual observations, we aggregate volumes over the calendar year and use prices from 
the last day of June on which non-zero trades are recorded for voting and non-voting 
shares. Annual information on the numbers of shares outstanding and on the 
ownership structure were compiled from Handbuch der deutschen Aktiengesell-
schaften. For the calculation of abnormal returns, we need the returns on the full 
Frankfurt market portfolio (DAFOX), which have also been provided by KKMDB. 
The final sample contains data on 79 companies and spans the 27 years from 1974 to 
2000.  13
6. Empirical evidence on the block trading activity in 
voting shares 
6.1 PBV: A measure for the block trading activity in voting shares 
Our dataset does not contain the size of individual trades. It does contain, however, 
the trading volume and the number of trades for each trading day and for each 
security. Therefore, we can calculate the average trade size for each trading day and 
each security as the ratio of the euro trading volume and the number of trades. From 
these average trade sizes, we calculate our measure of the block trading activity in 
voting shares in four steps:  
1.  If the average trade size is missing for an observation (e.g., because there were 
no trades in this security on this day), this observation is deleted together with 
its voting or non-voting twin.  
2.  For each company-year, we pool the remaining daily average trade sizes of 
voting and non-voting shares and rank them. Due to the first step, exactly 50% 
of the observations in the pooled sample are trades in voting shares. 
3.  We delete all average trade size observations in the pooled sample except the 
5% largest.  
4.  We count how many of the remaining average trades were in voting shares.  
This gives us the “percentage of block trades in voting shares” PBV(0.05). By 
discarding all observations except the 2.5% largest in the third step, we obtain 
PBV(0.025), etc. Note that, by construction, PBV(1) = 50%, because then no 
observations are deleted in the third step. 
When we use this measure in regressions, we need to calculate it for each company 
and each year. Therefore, the counting in the fourth step is done for each company-
year. In order to arrive at meaningful numbers of PBV, we discard all company-year 
observations for which there are less than 100 pairs of average trade sizes. This 
ensures that we calculate PBV(0.05) from at least 5%*200=10 trade size observations. 
In this subsection, we want to describe PBV(x) across all companies and all years. 
Lest we unnecessarily discard any information, we therefore calculate PBV in the 
fourth step across all companies and all years.  
Panel A of Table 3 displays PBV(x) for several values of x from 0.01 to 1 together 
with the p-value of the binomial test of the hypothesis “PBV(x) = 50%”. Panel A  14
demonstrates that PBV(0.05)=57%, i.e., 57% of the 5% largest trades were in voting 
shares and only 43% in non-voting shares. Hence, large trades occur significantly 
more often in voting shares than in non-voting shares. Under the null-hypothesis that 
our model is wrong, we would expect that 50% of all block trades occur in voting 
shares – if the two types of shares are equally liquid. If one type of shares is more 
liquid than the other, we would expect more block trades in the more liquid class. 
Hence, the result in Panel A could be entirely due to the fact that voting shares are, on 
average, more liquid than non-voting shares. 
In order to distinguish between the two effects, we split the sample before 
calculating PBV, depending on whether the annual euro trading volume in a given 
company-year was higher in voting shares or in non-voting shares. Panel B of Table 3 
shows PBV(x) calculated for all company-years for which the volume of voting shares 
was smaller than the volume of non-voting shares. Panel C displays the respective 
results for the remaining part of the sample. It indeed turns out that PBV(x) is larger 
than 50% if voting shares are more liquid and smaller than 50% if non-voting shares 
are more liquid. Note, however, that PBV(x) is not symmetric across the two panels B 
and C: If voting shares are more liquid, PBV(0.05) exceeds 50% by 24 percentage 
points, whereas, if non-voting shares are more liquid, PBV(0.05) is merely 8 
percentage points lower than 50%. Therefore, Table 3 suggests that there is a higher 
block-trading activity in voting shares than in non-voting shares and that this effect 
cannot be attributed entirely to liquidity. 
6.2 The price impact of block trades 
Note that our measure of the block trading activity in voting shares, PBV(x), is not 
based on individual trades but rather on average daily trades. In order to show that 
PBV(x) is indeed a measure of block trades, we calculate the price impact of these 
largest average trades in our sample and compare them to standard results on the price 
impact of block trades in the literature. 
To this end, we calculate two-day abnormal returns from day –1 to day 1 for each 
trading day in our sample. Here, abnormal returns are simply the difference between 
the security’s return and the market return. We calculate two-day returns instead of 
one-day returns, because our returns are calculated from prices set in an auction about 
halfway during the trading period (“Kassakurs”) whereas volume and number of  15
trades refer to the full trading period. The second column of Table 4 displays the 
averages of these abnormal returns for voting and non-voting shares. 
The method described in the previous subsection identifies 16,803 block trades 
from the total 324,750 daily observations in the combined sample of voting and non-
voting shares. As usual in the literature (see, e.g., Holthausen, Leftwich and Mayers, 
1990), we distinguish between buyer initiated block trades, i.e., block trades on days 
with positive abnormal return, and seller initiated block trades, i.e., block trades on 
days with negative abnormal return. Therefore, we decompose the 16,803 block trades 
into four subsamples: 5,027 buyer initiated block trades in voting shares, 3,808 buyer 
initiated trades in non-voting shares, 4,622 seller initiated block trades in voting 
shares, and 3,346 seller initiated block trades in non-voting shares. Panel A of Table 4 
shows the price impact of these four types of block trades on voting shares and on 
non-voting shares. Panel B shows similar results for the case that only the largest 
2.5% of all average daily trades are defined as block trades. 
The first observation from Table 4 is that there are consistently more buyer 
initiated trades than seller initiated trades in our sample. This contrasts sharply with 
Holthausen, Leftwich and Mayers (1987) who find for different measures of trading 
activity that large seller initiated trades are more frequent than large buyer initiated 
trades. Note, however, that Holthausen, Leftwich and Mayers (1987) use tick data 
while we use 2-day abnormal returns. Many large trades occur on zero-ticks in 
Holthausen, Leftwich and Mayers (1987). As zero abnormal returns are extremely 
unlikely, our method will classify zero-tick trades either as buyer initiated block 
trades or as seller initiated block trades – depending on what else happened during the 
two-day window. 
The second finding from Table 4 is that seller initiated trades move prices by   
-1.9% on average, whereas buyer initiated trades have an impact of +2.5%. In 
absolute terms, the impact of buyer initiated trades is significantly higher than the 
impact of seller initiated trades. This asymmetry between the impact of buyer and 
seller initiated trades is consistent with the literature (see, e.g., Holthausen, Leftwich, 
and Mayers, 1987, 1990). However, the permanent price effects found by Holthausen, 
Leftwich, and Mayers (1990) are much smaller than ours: -0.9% for seller initiated 
trades and +1.1% for buyer initiated sales. Again, the difference between these two 
sets of results might be due to the fact that we consider two-day abnormal returns 
whereas Holthausen, Leftwich and Mayers (1990) work with tick data.  16
Third, we observe from Table 4 that block trades in voting shares have a higher 
impact on voting share prices than on non-voting share prices. Likewise, block trades 
in non-voting shares have a higher impact on non-voting share prices than on voting 
share prices. This pattern appears sensible because an informed trader’s block 
purchase of voting shares can be motivated by two types of information: First, the 
trader might have received positive information about the value of the firm. Such 
information should have the same impact on the share prices of voting and non-voting 
stock. Note that this is the situation modeled in Section 3. The model therefore 
predicts that the price effect of any block trade is identical for the two types of shares. 
Second, the trader might have private information about the future probability of an 
insider’s block purchase or of a takeover. Such information is likely to have opposite 
effects on voting and non-voting share prices. Hence, on average, we would expect 
that a buyer-initiated block trade in voting shares has a stronger impact on voting 
shares than on non-voting shares. 
To sum up, Table 4 demonstrates that the 5% (or 2.5%) largest average daily trades 
have all the properties of genuine block trades. Hence, PBV(x) appears to be a 
sensible measure of the block trading activity in voting shares. In the remainder of this 
paper, we concentrate on PBV(0.05), because Tables 3 and 4 indicate that there is no 
qualitative difference between the 5% largest trades and the 2.5% largest trades. 
PBV(0.05) has the advantage of being calculated from twice as many observations as 
PBV(0.025).
5 
6.3 Determinants of the block trading activity 
We now turn to regressions of the block trading activity PBV(0.05) on a number of 
other variables. For this, we use the panel dataset described in Sections 5 and 6.1 
which contains 717 country-year observations. Table 5 describes all variables we use 
in our regression analysis and displays their means and medians. The average market 
                                                 
5 We also constructed a measure of the block purchase activity in voting shares by looking at the 
5% largest buyer initiated trades. Like PBV(0.025) it is calculated from roughly only half as many 
observations as PBV(0.05). We repeated the analysis summarized in Tables 5 to 8 with these two 
alternative measures and obtained qualitatively the same and quantitatively similar results. Generally, 
the standard errors are somewhat higher for these alternative measures – presumably due to the smaller 
number of observations they are based on. These additional results are available from the author upon 
request.  17
capitalization in our sample is € 1.6 bn, the average voting premium is 12.7% and the 
average size of the largest voting block is 51.4%. 
In contrast to much of the literature, we define the voting premium as the price 
difference between voting and non-voting shares divided by the price of voting shares: 
v nv v P P P VP / ) ( − = . We do not scale the price difference by the price of non-voting 
shares, because the price difference is an estimate of the block purchase premium π 
(see equation 1) which is an income to voting shareholders. Consequently, we divide 
it by the price of voting shares in order to obtain the voting shareholders’ return from 
having the right to vote. Econometrically, this choice also makes sense, because the 
price of non-voting shares might be considerably lower than the price of voting 
shares. In this case, scaling by the price of voting shares prevents extremely high 
values of the voting premium. If we scale by the price of non-voting shares, the 
average voting premium would be 18.5% (where one percentage point is solely due to 
a single outlier with a 642% voting premium). We conjecture that the convention to 
scale with the price of non-voting shares is the reason for the high variation in the 
different estimates of the German voting premium which vary between 17.2% and 
41.6% (see e.g. Daske and Ehrhardt, 2002, Fatemi and Krahnen, 2000, Hoffmann-
Burchardi, 1999, Kruse, Berg and Weber, 1993). 
From Table 3 we already know that the block trading activity in voting shares 
depends strongly on the liquidity differences between the two classes of shares. We 
use two alternative variables to control for differential liquidity. The first is LR, the 
ratio of the annual euro trading volume of voting shares to the annual euro trading 
volume of non-voting shares. The second is logLR, the natural logarithm of this 
liquidity ratio LR. Our data source does not contain bid or ask prices, so bid-ask 
spreads cannot be used. Table 6 shows our regression results with PBV(0.05) as 
dependent variable. Models 1 and 2 show that both liquidity variables have a highly 
significant effect on the block trading activity PBV(0.05).
6 In both models, the 
liquidity adjusted block trading activity (52.1% in model 1 and 56.2% in model 2) is 
significantly larger than 50%. This is direct evidence for our hypothesis no. 1 that 
                                                 
6 In all ordinary least squares regressions, we calculate heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors 
as proposed by Davidson and MacKinnon (1993, p. 554): We estimate the OLS estimates’ covariance 
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large trades are more likely to occur in voting shares than in non-voting shares. Since 
logLR has the higher t-statistic and leads to a markedly higher R
2, we use logLR as 
liquidity control in the remaining regressions. in Table 3 
Model 3 shows that the log of the firm’s market capitalization (logMCap) has no 
significant impact on PBV(0.05), although the sign is negative as expected. The size 
of the largest voting block (BSize) has a highly significant negative effect on the 
block trading activity as models 4 and 5 demonstrate. The introduction of two-way 
fixed effects (models 6 to 10) renders BSize insignificant but does not change the 
other results. As the ownership structure varies only little within firms but a lot 
between firms, this result is not surprising. Altogether we conclude that there is some 
evidence that the size of the largest voting block has a negative effect on the block 
trading activity in voting shares as stated in hypothesis 2. 
7. The empirical relationship between block trading 
activity and voting premium 
In this section, we want to test hypothesis 3 which states that the block trading 
activity in voting shares, PBV(0.05), has significant explanatory power for the voting 
premium. Note that simple regressions of the voting premium on PBV(0.05) and 
further control variables potentially suffer from an endogeneity bias. The reason is 
that, in equity markets, prices and quantities are determined simultaneously and that 
the voting premium, PBV(0.05), as well as our liquidity and size controls all depend 
on prices or quantities. Even the ownership structure might be endogenous, because a 
high voting premium might signal high private benefits of control and therefore attract 
block investments. Standard methods to overcome such endogeneity problems are the 
use of lagged independent variables, fixed effects, and instrumental variables. We will 
apply all three methods in turn. 
Table 7 displays the results of OLS and fixed effects regressions with the voting 
premium as dependent variable. Models 1 and 2 regress the voting premium on the 
lagged values of the ownership structure, the market value and the liquidity 
difference. Such regressions are typical in the empirical literature on the voting 
premium. We find that the size of the largest voting block, BSize, has a significant 
negative effect on the voting premium and that both liquidity ratios have a positive 
impact on the voting premium. The log of the market capitalization is insignificant.  19
The introduction of two-way fixed effects (models 5 and 6) wipes out the significance 
of BSize, which is not surprising, because the ownership structure varies much more 
between firms than within firms.
7 In models 3, 4, 7 and 8, we additionally introduce 
the lagged value of the block trading activity PBV(0.05) as independent variable. 
PBV(0.05) turns out to be highly significant in all specifications. Moreover, the 
introduction of lagged PBV(0.05) renders the size of the largest voting block 
insignificant and also changes the estimates of the liquidity controls markedly. The 
reason is that PBV(0.05) is strongly correlated with BSize (correlation: -0.35), LR 
(correlation: 0.43) and logLR (correlation: 0.68). 
We also tackle the endogeneity problem of PBV(0.05) by running instrumental 
variable regressions, using two different sets of instrumental variables. In the first set 
of regressions, the lagged values of LR, BSize and logMCap are the instruments and 
PBV(0.05) is treated as endogenous variable. So effectively, we regress PBV(0.05) on 
the lagged values of LR, BSize and logMCap, calculate the fitted values from this 
regression, and finally regress the voting premium on these fitted values. The results 
of these IV regressions are shown in Panel A of Table 8. Panel B presents the 
corresponding results if the lagged values of logLR, BSize and logMCap are used as 
instruments. 
Like in all the previous regressions, there is overwhelming evidence that 
PBV(0.05) has a positive impact on the voting premium. Note also that the regression 
R
2 are much higher here than in the corresponding regressions on the instruments only 
(models 1 and 2 in Table 7). Furthermore, the exogenous variables themselves (LR, 
                                                 
7 In the empirical literature, such regressions of the voting premium usually include additional right-
hand-side variables, that do not appear in our tables. Additional variables that describe the ownership 
structure are, e.g., the Shapley value or the size of the second-largest voting block. In simple 
regressions of the voting premium or of PBV(0.05), the second largest voting block is insignificant and 
the Shapley value has less explanatory power than the size of the largest voting block BSize. Another 
popular right-hand side variable is the proportion of voting shares among all outstanding shares. This 
variable is not significant in any of our regressions once we control for liquidity. Besides it is strongly 
correlated with our liquidity controls, so that collinearity problems could arise if we included it. 
Finally, we do not introduce dividend controls, because these variables have been shown to be 
endogenous in regressions of the voting premium. Dittmann (2003) presents evidence that German 
firms with high voting premium choose to pay higher dividends on non-voting shares. The introduction 
of dividend controls into our regressions would not change the results, but we would have to discuss 
and solve another endogeneity problem that is unrelated to the main point of this paper.  20
logLR, BSize and logMCap) are clearly insignificant once the fitted values of 
PBV(0.05) are introduced in the regression. Hence, we conclude that there is 
substantial evidence that the block trading activity in voting shares has a positive 
effect on the voting premium. Moreover, the voting premium depends on the 
ownership structure and the liquidity difference between voting and non-voting shares 
mainly through the block trading activity. Once we control for the block trading 
activity in voting shares, the ownership structure has no significant effect on the 
voting premium. These results confirm hypothesis 3. 
8. Conclusions and Further Notes 
This paper puts forward a new explanation as to how private benefits of control are 
reflected in share prices. We argue that existing or future blockholders might want to 
acquire a small block of voting shares in the market in order to improve their chances 
to obtain private benefits of control in the future. For a comprehensive sample of 
German voting and non-voting shares, we find that large trades are indeed more often 
executed in voting shares than in non-voting shares, even when we control for 
differences in liquidity between the two types of shares. Moreover, we show that the 
trading activity in voting shares depends significantly on the ownership structure of 
the firm. 
The microstructure model in Section 3 shows that expected future block share 
purchases lead to a spread between the prices of voting and non-voting shares. As a 
consequence, voting shares trade above the present value of their expected future 
cash-flows, a result that also holds for the shares of single-class companies. In a 
numerical example, we show that, under plausible assumptions, our model can 
generate voting premia in the typically observed range between 5% and 15%. 
In our empirical analysis of German dual-class companies, we find substantial 
evidence for our theory. The block trading activity in voting shares has a highly 
significant impact on the voting premium. Using instrumental variables regressions, 
we further show that the well-known dependence of the voting premium on the 
ownership structure is only indirect: The ownership structure affects the block trading 
activity in voting shares which in turn affects the voting premium. Once we control 
for the block trading activity in voting shares, there is no significant correlation 
between ownership structure and voting premium.  21
Although the empirical results are for Germany only, we conjecture that our theory 
can also explain the voting premium (or a part of it) for most other countries. There is 
a sizeable empirical literature that documents a positive voting premium for various 
countries, but only few studies are able to explain the premium by observed takeover 
bids alone. A combination of our block purchase theory and the takeover theory 
appears to be a convincing explanation for the observed voting premium worldwide. 
Our results are relevant for at least two important fields of corporate governance. 
First, they establish a basis for estimating private benefits of control from stock 
market data and for comparing these estimates across countries (see Nenova, 2003 
and Dittmann, 2003). The takeover theory alone is clearly not able to explain the 
cross-country variation in the voting premium, because the voting premium is 
typically  lower  in countries with higher takeover activity as Table 1 suggests. In 
contrast, the block purchase theory put forward in this paper is potentially capable of 
explaining this variation. It might also help to identify necessary control variables for 
performing cross-country comparisons of private benefits of control. 
Secondly, our results might help to explain the relationship between a firm’s 
ownership structure and its market value. Given that firms differ in the amount of 
private benefits a coalition of controlling shareholders can extract from the company, 
our argument predicts a curvilinear relationship between inside ownership and firm 
value as it has been found by, among others, Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) and 
McConnell and Servaes (1990). If private benefits of control are small, inside 
ownership and the probability of block purchases by insiders will both be small. The 
low probability of block purchases results in a small voting premium, i.e. a 
comparatively low market value. If, on the other hand, private benefits are large, 
inside ownership will be large and the probability of block purchases will be small, 
because the ruling coalition is stable. For medium levels of private benefits we would 
expect medium levels of inside ownership and large voting premia, as the probability 
of block purchases by insiders becomes large. Hence, the market value of firms would 
increase in inside ownership for small levels of inside ownership and decrease for 
large levels of inside ownership.
8 This argument is consistent with the results of 
                                                 
8 We do not find a curvilinear (but only a linear) relationship between voting premium and inside 
ownership in our dataset. The reason is that we consider dual class companies which presumably have  22
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) who find no significant relationship between ownership 
structure and operating performance. It is also consistent with Loderer and Martin 
(1997) and Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999) who both conclude that the 







List of variables used 
b  number of shares the blockholder might potentially want to acquire (constant) 
B
~
  blockholder’s private benefit of owning an additional block b of voting shares 
with realizations 0 and  0 > B . 
L
~
  random liquidation payment with realizations L  and L with  L L < . 
M  number of voting shares in the free-float 
m  number of blocks of size b/2 in the free-float (i.e., m = 2 M / b) 
N  number of potentially informed investors 
n  number of years until the dual-class structure is terminated 
p  probability that blockholder orders b shares after observing  B B =  
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t r ~   true return of voting shares over period t 
nv
t r ~   true return of non-voting shares over period t 
* ~v
t r   observed return of voting shares over period t (net of block purchase premia) 
uv, unv  blockholder’s order of voting shares and non-voting shares, respectively 
yv, ynv  informed trader’s order of voting shares and non-voting shares, respectively 
α  probability that  B B =
~
 
δ  probability that informed investor owns b/2 voting shares 
π  block purchase premium 
                                                                                                                                            
a comparatively high level of extractable private benefits of control. Firms with low private benefits of 
control do not have dual-class structures and are therefore not included in our sample.  23
Proof of Proposition 1 
We will first calculate the equilibrium price for voting shares at time t = 2 under 
the assumption that the two players stick to the strategies described in the proposition. 
After that we will show that deviating from these strategies is not optimal. 
Let δ  be the probability that the informed trader owns b/2 voting shares at time t = 
2. Note that there are m blocks of size b/2 in the free-float. As voting shares trade 
above their liquidation value at time t = 1 (as we will shortly see), owning more than 
b/2 voting shares has no benefits but only costs. Therefore, δ = m/N. 




 and on whether the informed trader 
owns voting shares, there are six different pairs of orders (uv, yv). The table below 
displays these six outcomes and the total order flow uv + yv that is observed by the 
market maker together with the probabilities of these outcomes. The right column 
shows the realization of L
~
 which the market maker will try to deduce from the total 
order flow. 
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In four of these six potential outcomes, the market maker immediately knows the 
signal  L
~
 and therefore chooses the respective prices:  L b P P b P
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and  L b P
v = ) 2 / 3 ( 2 . Only if uv + yv = b/2, the market maker does not know the value 
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. According to the probabilities in the table, he will set: 
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If the blockholder observes  B B = , she buys a block if the benefit B  is larger than 
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v  (3) 
Under the maintained assumption that  2 / ) ( b L L B − ≥ , condition (3) holds and the 
blockholder will buy a block whenever she observes  B B = . 
Given the blockholder’s trading strategy, it is straightforward to verify the 
optimality of the informed trader’s strategy. 
Proof of Proposition 2 
A potentially informed investor who owns b/2 voting shares just after time t = 1 
expects the following revenues from selling these shares at time t = 2 or liquidating 
them at time t = 3: 
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This proves equation (1). It remains to show that 
v P 1  increases in α. Taking the first 
derivative of 
v P 1  with respect to α and equating this to zero yields the solution 
z z z − − =
2 α  with z = N/(N–m). For  z z z − − <
2 α , 
v P 1  strictly increases in α. 
As  5 . 0
2 > − − z z z , 
v P 1  strictly increases in α if α < 0.5.  25
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Table 1: 
Empirical literature on differential tender offers and the voting premium 
This table summarizes 12 empirical papers that include information on the voting premium and on the frequency of tender offers with differential bids. The ex-ante voting 
premium is the average relative price difference between voting and non-voting shares (or superior and inferior-voting shares), i.e., (P
v – P
nv)/P





v is the tender offer (in money or stocks) on voting shares and TO
nv on non-voting shares. The ex-post voting premium is the average 
tender offer premium multiplied by the number of differential tender offers and divided by the number of firms in the sample. 





















USA  1940-1978 26  5.4%  0  N/A  0%  Lease, McConnell and Mikkelson (1983)
USA 1984-1990 94  10.5%  2  81.5%  1.7%  Zingales  (1995) 
USA  1960-1980 144  N/A  4  130.9%  3.6%  DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985) 
UK 1955-1982 152  13.3%  37  32.1%  7.8%  Megginson  (1990) 
Canada  1981-1992 98  10.4%  20  57.2%  11.7%  Smith and Amoako-Adu (1995) 
Israel 1981  25  45.5%  0  N/A  0%  Levy  (1982) 
Sweden  1980-1990 65  15.2%  9  27%  3.7%  Bergström and Rydqvist (1992) 
Germany 1988-1997 84  26.3%  0  N/A  0% Hoffmann-Burchardi  (1999) 
Germany  1956-1998 101  17.2%  0  N/A  0%  Daske and Ehrhardt (2002) 
Switzerland 1973-1983 45  22.4%  0  N/A  0%  Horner (1988) 
Switzerland 1990-1991 29  18%  0  N/A  0%  Kunz and Angel (1996) 




Block purchase premium and relative price difference 
This table displays values for the (daily) block purchase premium π from equation (1) depending on the 
probability α of a block purchase and the size of insider information  L L − . The value of the firm is 
normalized to one:  1 2 / ) ( ≡ + L L . The number of potentially informed traders, N, is 50, the voting 
share free float is 40%, and the block size, b, is 2%. The annual block purchase premium is equal to the 
daily premium multiplied by 250. The relative price difference is equal to the annual block purchase 
premium divided by the risk-free rate of 5.5%. 




1% 10%  0.0010%  0.248%  4.51% 
2% 10%  0.0020%  0.492%  8.94% 
3%  10% 0.0029% 0.732% 13.31% 
1% 20%  0.0020%  0.496%  9.02% 
2%  20% 0.0039% 0.984% 17.89% 





Block trading activity in voting shares 
This table displays the percentage of block trades in voting shares, PBV(x), for several values of x 
together with the p-value of the binomial test of “PBV(x)=50%”. x denotes the relative size of the 
blocks considered. For example, PBV(0.05) is the proportion of the 5% largest block trades that 
occurred in voting shares. Panel A shows PBV(x) for the complete sample, Panel B for the subsample 
with those company-years in which the total euro trading volume was higher for non-voting shares than 
for voting shares, and Panel C for the complementary subsample. 
  Panel A  Panel B  Panel C 
  All observations  More liquid non-
voting shares 
More liquid voting 
shares 
x  PBV(x) p-value   PBV(x) p-value   PBV(x) p-value 
0.010  58.90% 0.0000    45.32% 0.0004   73.36% 0.0000 
0.025  58.40% 0.0000    43.54% 0.0000   74.30% 0.0000 
0.050  57.32% 0.0000    41.93% 0.0000   73.72% 0.0000 
0.100  56.80% 0.0000    40.31% 0.0000   74.32% 0.0000 
0.150  56.29% 0.0000    39.89% 0.0000   73.72% 0.0000 
0.250  55.47% 0.0000    39.69% 0.0000   72.22% 0.0000 
0.500  54.02% 0.0000    41.45% 0.0000   67.36% 0.0000 
0.750  51.30% 0.0000    44.58% 0.0000   58.44% 0.0000 
1.000  50.00% 1.0000    50.00% 1.0000   50.00% 1.0000 
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Table 4: 
Block trades and average market-adjusted returns 
This table displays average market-adjusted returns from day –1 to day 1 of voting and non-voting shares for different 
subsamples. Block trades are defined as follows: For each security and each day, the average daily trade size is 
calculated as the ratio of the daily euro trading volume and the number of transactions. For each company-year, we 
pool these average daily trade sizes of voting and non-voting shares. Block trades are then defined as the 5% 
(respectively, 2.5%) largest average daily trade sizes in these combined samples. Buyer initiated block trades are 
defined as block trades on days with positive abnormal return. Seller initiated block trades are defined as block trades 
on days with negative abnormal return. Standard errors are given in parentheses. 
 
Panel A: Block trades are defined as the 5% largest average daily trades 
  
Buyer initiated 
block trades in 
Seller initiated 












Voting shares  0.0036% 








Non-voting shares  0.0182% 
(0.0080%)     1.6296% 
(0.0811%) 
2.5375% 




Observations  162,375     5,027 3,808    4,622 3,346 
 
Panel B: Block trades are defined as the 2.5% largest average daily trades 
  
Buyer initiated 
block trades in 
Seller initiated 












Voting shares  0.0036% 








Non-voting shares  0.0182% 
(0.0080%)     1.6909% 
(0.1388%) 
2.5254% 








Description of the variables used in the regression analysis 
 
Acronym Description  Mean    Median  Minimum  Maximum
VP  Voting Premium: 
v nv v P P P / ) ( −   12.73% 12.09% -40.43% 86.52% 
PBV(0.05)  Percentage of Block trades in Voting shares, where block trades are defined 
as the 5% largest trades (in voting and non-voting shares) per company-year. 57.09% 57.14%  0%  100% 
BSize  Percentage of voting shares held by the largest blockholder  51.42%  51.00%  0%  100% 
LR  Liquidity Ratio: annual euro trading volume of voting shares divided by 
annual euro trading volume of non-voting shares  3.168 0.862 0.046  67.549 
log_LR  natural logarithm of LR  0.0705  -0.1491  -3.077  4.213 
MCap  Market Capitalization (in million euro)  1,569.04  283.08  3.40  61,318.20 
log_MCap  natural logarithm of MCap  19.67  19.46  15.04  24.84  32
Table 6: 
Determinants of the block trading activity in voting shares 
This table displays the results of 10 ordinary least squares regressions in which the percentage of the 5% largest block 
trades in voting shares, PBV(0.05), is the dependent variable. The liquidity ratio LR is the annual euro trading volume 
in voting shares divided by the annual euro trading volume in non-voting shares. logLR is the log of LR. logMCap is 
the log of the market capitalization. BSize is the size of the largest block of voting shares. Models 1 to 5 include no 
fixed effects; models 6 to 10 include firm and year fixed effects. Heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors are given 
in parentheses. 
 
Model Intercept  LR  logLR  logMCap  BSize  fixed 
effects  R
2 
1  0.5212 
(0.0115) 
0.0157 
(0.0026)      no 0.1696 
2  0.5616 
(0.0077)  
0.1320 
(0.0054)     no  0.4466 
3  0.6732 
(0.0970)    0.1371 
(0.0063) 
-0.0058 
(0.0049)   no  0.4581 
4  0.6180 
(0.0212)    0.1261 
(0.0060)   
-0.1145 
(0.0377)  no 0.4610 
5  0.7142 





(0.0401)  no 0.4673 
6 N/A 0.0092 
(0.0021)      yes  0.6201 
7 N/A    0.1701 
(0.0109)     yes  0.7081 
8 N/A    0.1763 
(0.0112) 
-0.0100 
(0.0144)   yes  0.7158 
9 N/A    0.1676 
(0.0112)  
-0.0805 
(0.0551)  yes 0.7131 





(0.0545)  yes 0.7228 
  33
Table 7: 
Determinants of the voting premium 
This table displays the results of 8 ordinary least squares regressions in which the voting premium  v nv v P P P VP / ) ( − =  
is the dependent variable. All independent variables have been lagged by one year. The liquidity ratio LR is the annual 
euro trading volume in voting shares divided by the annual euro trading volume in non-voting shares. logLR is the log 
of LR. logMCap is the log of the market capitalization. BSize is the size of the largest block of voting shares. 
PBV(0.05) is the percentage of the 5% largest average daily trades that occurred in voting shares. Models 1 to 4 
include no fixed effects; models 5 to 8 include firm and year fixed effects. The p-values of the t-test for zero slope or 
intercept using heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors are given in parentheses. 
 
 
Model Intercept  LR  logLR  BSize  logMCap PBV(0.05)  fixed 
effects R
2 
1  0.0360 
(0.6969) 
0.0028 
(0.0029)    -0.0658 
(0.0201) 
0.0057 
(0.2084)   no  0.0468 
2  0.0222 





(0.1882)   no  0.0393 
3  -0.0243 
(0.7777) 
0.0009 





(<0.0001)  no 0.1114 
4  -0.1053 







(<0.0001)  no 0.1200 
5 N/A  -0.0020 
(0.0468)    0.0538 
(0.1951) 
0.0053 
(0.6221)   yes  0.6691 





(0.5320)   yes  0.6669 
7 N/A  -0.0026 





(0.0020)  yes 0.6747 







(0.0036)  yes 0.6719  34
Table 8: 
Instrumental variables regressions of the voting premium 
This table displays the results of 8 instrumental variables regressions in which the voting premium  v nv v P P P VP / ) ( − =  
is the dependent variable. The liquidity ratio LR is the annual euro trading volume in voting shares divided by the 
annual euro trading volume in non-voting shares. logLR is the log of LR. logMCap is the log of the market 
capitalization. BSize is the size of the largest block of voting shares. PBV(0.05) is the percentage of the 5% largest 
average daily trades that occurred in voting shares. Panel A and B display similar results for two different sets of 
instrumental variables. The p-values of the t-test for zero slope or intercept using heteroscedasticity consistent standard 
errors are given in parentheses. 
 
Panel A: IV regressions with lagged LR, lagged BSize and lagged logMCap as instruments 
Model Intercept lagged  LR lagged 
BSize 
lagged 
logMCap  PBV(0.05)  R
2 
1  0.0018 
(0.9375)      0.2168 
(<0.0001)  0.1103 
2  0.0221 
(0.4687) 
0.0010 
(0.3651)     0.1749 
(0.0024)  0.1203 
3  -0.0455 
(0.4028)    0.0417 
(0.3380)    0.2626 
(0.0025)  0.0903 
4  -0.0307 
(0.6954)        0.0020 
(0.6739) 
0.2057 
(0.0002)  0.1140 
 
Panel B: IV regressions with lagged logLR, lagged BSize and lagged logMCap as instruments 





logMCap  PBV(0.05)  R
2 
1  0.0431 
(0.0349)      0.1433 
(<0.0001)  0.1140 
2  -0.0596 
(0.4457) 
-0.0251 
(0.1948)     0.3282 
(0.0193)  0.0840 
3  0.0670 
(0.0592)    -0.0274 
(0.3884)    0.1259 
(0.0022)  0.1102 
4  -0.0482 
(0.5533)        0.0051 
(0.2920) 
0.1267 
(0.0025)  0.1125 
 